

IBSEC-AR/4
30 April 1963

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SECURITY COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT : Fourth Annual Report of the Security Committee

There is attached for the consideration of the Board the Fourth Annual Report of the Security Committee. This report covers the activities of the Security Committee from 26 April 1962 through 30 April 1963.

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Chairman

Attachment

Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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30 April 1963

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE
Fourth Annual Report

I. AUTHORIZATION

The USIB Security Committee operates under DCID 1/11 (New Series), dated 24 March 1959.

II. PERIOD COVERED

This report covers activities during the period 26 April 1962 through 30 April 1963.

III. OBSERVATIONS

The past year has shown the continued recognition of the community security responsibilities which all USIB member agencies equally share.

The USIB Policy Statement, issued on 18 July 1962, described later herein, sets forth the need for closer coordination and exchange of pertinent information among the security and counterintelligence

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components. The USIB paper on the foreign travel of individuals possessing special security clearances issued on 1 April 1963, which is also described later herein, similarly expresses coordinating responsibilities upon each USIB member agency.

It is felt that security problems which affect more than one USIB member have been effectively resolved through coordinated action of the Committee and this serves to promote uniform security practices and procedures among the USIB member departments and agencies.

The problem of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence remains a matter of continuing concern. Considerable effort has been expended in those instances where it appears that an unauthorized disclosure may have occurred.

IV. ACTIVITIES

A. Implementation of Recommendations of the Joint Study Group Report on "Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government," dated 15 December 1960.

Recommendation No. 18

Recommendation No. 18 of the Joint Study Group states that the Director of Central Intelligence should focus community attention on the important area of counterintelligence and security of overseas personnel and installations.

The Committee conducted an extensive review of existing policy governing counterintelligence and the security of overseas personnel and installations. Such policy was found to be adequate. The Committee found; however, that the security and counterintelligence components of the USIB member agencies with overseas responsibilities should maintain closer coordination and liaison in order to ensure the timely development and exchange of pertinent counterintelligence and security information. In order to properly "focus community attention" on this problem, the Committee felt that a Policy Statement by the United States Intelligence Board was necessary to define more adequately the mutual security and counterintelligence responsibilities shared by the USIB members engaged in overseas activities.

The USIB approved the "Policy Statement Concerning Counterintelligence and Security Responsibilities" on 18 July 1962 (USIB-D-1.5/24). The Policy Statement affirmed that there must be an exchange of pertinent information and as close coordination as possible among the security and counterintelligence components of those USIB departments and agencies having overseas responsibilities in order that the hostile threat may be adequately assessed and effective countermeasures taken. The USIB Policy Statement requested USIB member departments and agencies to review as they deemed appropriate their existing programs,

regulations, practices and procedures concerning counterintelligence and personnel and physical security.

A "Guide of Practices and Procedures for Counterintelligence and Security of Overseas Personnel and Installations" was issued as an attachment to the Policy Statement for utilization by the departments and agencies in the over-all review. It was suggested that revision of existing programs, regulations, practices and procedures be made wherever applicable and appropriate to ensure a more effective system for the protection of personnel and installations overseas.

B. Procedures for Foreign Travel of Personnel Possessing Special Security Clearances (USIB-D-9.6/6 of 1 April 1963).

The USIB, at its meeting on 19 September 1962 (USIB-M-234) directed the Security Committee to review the existing regulations and procedures, including pertinent provisions of DCID No. 6/3, which are intended to control foreign travel for personnel possessing special security clearances. This was later defined to specifically include procedures for COMINT, T, K-H and [REDACTED] systems 25X1A2d2 of compartmented intelligence. The study was coordinated with the SIGINT Committee.

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The Security Committee reaffirmed that official assignment and private travel to denied areas of persons cleared for sensitive intelligence involves certain degrees of risk in the protection of classified intelligence information involved. The risk results from a deliberate program of surveillance, provocation, entrapment and blackmail directed by denied area governments against U. S. nationals.

The Committee found that DCID 6/3 as now written provides adequate policy guidance for the control of foreign travel by persons indoctrinated for COMINT and no amendments or interpretations by USIB are necessary at this time.

The travel of personnel to denied areas involves three categories of personnel; namely, Government personnel, consultants to Government and contractor personnel. Each agency has established procedures governing foreign travel. Foreign travel of Government personnel does not present any problem due to the control which the Government can exercise. However, consultant and contractor personnel are of concern due to the nature of the employment relationship to the U. S. Government which limits direct control. A particular problem involving consultants and contractor personnel is their employment relationship in a sensitive capacity, in many instances, with more than one Government agency.

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The Committee found that there was a lack of coordination among the departments and agencies in approving foreign travel. A particular consultant or contractor employee could be granted approval for foreign travel by one department even though he was in a sensitive contractual capacity with another agency which had not been notified of the foreign travel. This lack of coordination also did not permit the total access to sensitive intelligence to be assessed against the risks involved.

To ensure coordination among the agencies and departments in foreign travel, particularly as concerns compartmented sensitive intelligence, the Committee recommended that prior to approving foreign travel, an agency should check the indices of the USIB Secretariat, for contractor personnel possessing COMINT, and the indices of the Special Security Center for intelligence community personnel possessing T, K-H and [REDACTED] clearances.

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The Committee also recommended that an individual should be given a security briefing upon departure and debriefing upon return where foreign travel has been approved. Departments and agencies should also be notified promptly through USIB of any individual who disregards the denial of a travel request and proceeds abroad to a denied area.

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C. Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Intelligence Information.

During the past year numerous articles have been reviewed as possible unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence. Appropriate inquiries have been conducted through the Secretariat of the Security Committee and analyses furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence as appropriate. In addition, other USIB member departments and agencies have been advised as appropriate. Procedures are continually being improved wherein reported unauthorized disclosures may be promptly reported and appropriate inquiries conducted on a timely basis.

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